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Burglars’ Take on Crime Prevention through Environmental Design (CPTED): 
Reconsidering the Relevance from an Offender Perspective 
Rachel Armitage 
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Abstract 
Crime Prevention through Environmental Design (CPTED) represents a multi-faceted 
approach to crime reduction that draws upon theories from urban design, psychology 
and criminology. Yet there remains a lack of clarity regarding CPTED’s definition 
and scope. CPTED has been defined by, amongst others Crowe (2000), Ekblom 
(2011) and Armitage (2013), and the principles upon which it is based have seen even 
greater discrepancy. Conscious that these principles have primarily been defined by 
academics and policy-makers, this research aims to rectify this imbalance. A sample 
of twenty-two incarcerated prolific burglars from three prisons (England), were asked 
to describe their response to sixteen images of residential housing. The results 
confirm that the design of residential housing influences burglar decision making, but 
that the principles of CPTED should be re-examined, with surveillance, and physical 
security a clear deterrent, yet management and maintenance and defensible space not 
considered as important in offender decision making.  
Key words 
Burglary, CPTED, Crime Prevention through Environmental Design, Crime Science, 
Situational Crime Prevention  
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Introduction  
Crime Prevention through Environmental Design (CPTED) emerged in the 1970s and 
1980s as an innovative approach to crime reduction that incorporated architecture, 
urban design, psychology and criminology and exemplified the multi-agency model 
of crime reduction that encouraged (in some countries required) relevant authorities to 
take responsibility for the impact of their functions on crime and disorder. Yet whilst 
its counterparts Environmental Criminology and later Crime Science were embracing 
this emphasis upon interdisciplinarity, CPTED remained the poor relation. Its 
intentions are faultless, its precision not so. CPTED has been defined (and redefined) 
by, amongst others, Crowe (2000), Ekblom (2011) and Armitage (2013) and the 
principles or components upon which is based have seen even greater imprecision. 
This is not simply a matter of semantics, a lack of clarity in definition and scope 
hinders measurement and risks credibility. Crowe (2000:22) argued that: “…the 
greatest impediment to the widespread use of CPTED is ignorance”, a much greater 
risk is surely ambiguity. Ekblom (2011) argues that such uncontrolled vocabulary 
would not be accepted within the natural sciences and there is little to suggest that it 
has been accepted within the social sciences; this lack of imprecision being one cause 
of CPTED’s continued and perhaps unjustified inferiority within Crime Science. This 
paper has commenced with a call to arms that should in no way be interpreted as a 
criticism of the approach of ensuring that crime prevention is considered within the 
design and build of housing (as well as other buildings and spaces). On the contrary, 
this approach has been demonstrated to be an effective crime reduction measure - the 
impact of individual design features on crime evidenced in, for example, Armitage, 
Monchuk, and Rogerson (2011) and Johnson and Bowers (2010) and as a 
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combination of measures in Armitage (2000), Armitage and Monchuk (2011). Its 
importance has also been recognised in planning policy - in England and Wales in the 
2012 Planning Policy Framework and the Planning Practice Guidance, as well as in 
crime reduction policy – for example the 2016 Modern Crime Prevention Strategy. 
The UK is not unique in its recognition of this importance, and a review of 
consideration for the impact of design on crime within international policy and 
regulation can be found in Armitage (2013).  
 
Theoretical Framework 
Place based crime prevention 
The influence of place on crime risk is well established within the study of crime, 
with a wealth of research confirming that features of design play a key role in 
vulnerability to crime at the neighbourhood, street and individual property level. At 
the neighbourhood level this includes, for example, distance of a property to a 
transport interchange (Groff and LaVigne, 2001), distance of a property to an 
offender’s residence (Bennett and Wright, 1984; Bernasco and Luykx, 2003; 
Bernasco and Nieuwbeerta, 2005; Rengert and Wasilchick, 1985; Wright and Decker, 
1994) and distance of a property to a footpath/pedestrian walkway (Armitage, 2006; 
2013). At the micro or property level, the presence or absence of specific design 
features can enhance or reduce its attractiveness to offenders (Armitage, 2006; 
Armitage et al., 2011; Brown and Altman, 1983; Brown and Bentley, 1993; 
Cromwell, Olson, and Avary 1991; Johnson and Bowers, 2010; Poyner, 1983; Nee 
and Meenaghan, 2006; Tseloni et al. 2014).  
 
Crime Prevention through Environmental Design  
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Research commencing in the 1960s and 1970s illustrated the role that design can play 
in this place-based approach to crime prevention (Angel, 1968; Jacobs, 1961; Jeffery, 
1971; Newman, 1973; Wood, 1961). In the ensuing decades, the concept of CPTED 
became increasingly recognised as an effective approach to the management of crime 
(Armitage, 2000; Armitage, 2013; Poyner, 1983; Poyner and Webb, 1991). CPTED 
aims to reduce crime by influencing the design, build and management of the built, 
and sometimes natural, environment. Armitage (2013:23) defines CPTED as: “The 
design, manipulation and management of the built environment to reduce crime and 
the fear of crime and to enhance sustainability through the process and application of 
measures at the micro (individual building/structure), meso (neighbourhood) and 
macro (national) level”. CPTED is largely described, particularly within academia, 
according to a series of principles or components and these vary considerably. As an 
example, Poyner (1983) outlined the four principles of CPTED as surveillance, 
movement control, activity support and motivational reinforcement. Cozens, Saville, 
and Hillier (2005) extended this to the seven principles of defensible space, access 
control, territoriality, surveillance, target hardening, image and activity support. 
Montoya, Junger and Ongena (2014) in their study of CPTED in the Netherlands, 
referred to the six principles of territoriality, surveillance, access control, target 
hardening, image/maintenance and activity support. Armitage (2013) offered yet 
another combination of physical security, surveillance, movement control, 
management and maintenance and defensible space. A brief introduction to these 
principles is provided here. Armitage’s (2013) five principles are used as a guide, 
however, the reader is reminded that other definitions and principles are presented 
elsewhere and that a full review of these can be found in Armitage (2013, 2016).  
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Defensible space or territoriality refers to the extent to which the physical design of a 
neighbourhood can increase or inhibit an individual’s sense of control over the space 
in which they reside (Newman, 1973). This is often achieved through the demarcation 
of private, semi-private, semi-public and public space (using design features such as a 
change of road colour and texture or the narrowing of the road) to ensure that it is 
clear who should and who should not be within a given area. Research suggests that 
the presence of these symbolic barriers reduces crime risk (Armitage, 2006; Brown 
and Altman, 1983; Montoya et al. 2014).  
 
Through movement or connectivity refers to the extent to which a development 
facilitates or limits access and egress via roads and pathways. This can be achieved 
through the design of road type (through road versus cul-de-sac) and the positioning 
of footpaths linking the development to other areas. The majority of research confirms 
that true culs-de-sac (with no connecting footpaths) experience significantly lower 
levels of crime than leaky culs-de-sac (those with connecting footpaths) or through 
roads (Armitage, 2006; Armitage et al. 2011; Hillier, 2004; Johnson and Bowers, 
2010).  
 
Surveillance refers to the way that an area is designed to maximise the ability of 
formal (security guards, police, employees) or informal (residents, passers-by, 
shoppers) users of the space to observe suspicious behaviour. It also relates to the 
extent to which offenders, or potential offenders perceive the possibility or likelihood 
of being observed, even if that perception is inaccurate. This is achieved through the 
positioning of properties within a development - ensuring that dwelling entrances face 
the street, that rooms facing the street are active (such as the kitchen or living room) 
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and ensuring that sightlines are not obstructed by shrubbery, high walls or fences. 
Research supports the premise that properties with high levels of surveillance 
experience lower levels of victimisation (Armitage, 2006; Armitage et al. 2011; Van 
der Voordt and Van Wegen, 1990; Winchester and Jackson, 1982) and that offenders 
perceive properties with high levels of natural surveillance to be less vulnerable to 
victimisation (Armitage and Joyce, 2017; Brown and Bentley, 1993; Nee and 
Meenaghan, 2006).  
 
Physical security, sometimes referred to as target hardening, relates to the extent to 
which a property and its boundaries are protected through the physical features of the 
building’s design - such as doors, windows, locks or fences. Security measures 
increase the difficulty of breaking in, they increase the time it takes to enter a property 
and, in some cases (e.g. CCTV), they increase the likelihood of detection. Research 
on the effectiveness of physical security as a means of reducing crime suggests that 
the presence of physical security reduces burglary risk (for example, Tseloni et al. 
2014; Vollaard and Ours, 2011) but that the protection conferred against burglary 
does not consistently increase with the number of devices installed (Tseloni et al. 
2014).  
 
Management and maintenance or image, brings together both Newman’s (1973) 
concept of avoiding stigma and Wilson and Kelling’s (1982) Broken Windows 
Theory. The former focuses upon the original design and build, and the latter upon 
management and maintenance following development. Newman argued that the 
proper use of materials and good architectural design (for example, through ensuring 
that social housing is not distinguishable from owner-occupied) can prevent residents 
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from feeling stigmatised. Wilson and Kelling’s (1982) Broken Windows Theory 
suggests that an area with existing deterioration such as graffiti and vandalism 
conveys the impression that a) nobody cares so apprehension is less likely and b) the 
area is already untidy so one more act will go unnoticed. Low-level disorder thus 
having a contagion effect and leading to more serious and more extensive crime. 
Evidence to support these assertions is provided by, amongst others, Armitage (2006), 
Cozens, Hillier and Prescott  (2001, 2002) and Taylor and Gottfredson (1987).  
 
Award schemes, or standards such as the UK’s Secured by Design (SBD) award 
scheme, or the Police Label Secured Housing scheme in the Netherlands set standards 
to ensure that each of these principles are applied – thus ensuring that housing 
incorporates each of these elements of CPTED in combination. Research has clearly 
demonstrated the crime reduction impact of such schemes (Armitage, 2000, 2006; 
Armitage and Monchuk, 2011; Brown, 1999; Pascoe, 1999; Teedon et al. 2009, 2010; 
Vollaard and Ours, 2011).    
 
So why ‘take on’ CPTED? 
This overview has demonstrated the effectiveness of CPTED in reducing crime and 
the recognition of this within policy and regulation. Its impact as a crime reduction 
measure is not in doubt; so why ‘take on CPTED’. This research has two primary 
objectives. The first is to ascertain the extent to which burglars agree with the existing 
components or principles of CPTED – to explore burglars’ take on the approach. The 
second is to use those findings to, where necessary, challenge the existing definition 
and scope of CPTED – to allow burglars to ‘take on’ CPTED. Both objectives have 
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an improvement orientation, with a view to promoting CPTED to its rightful place 
within existing academic debate.  
 
The reader may be forgiven for concluding that CPTED is under-researched. Whilst 
there is most certainly scope for improvement, this is not the case. However, what 
research that has been conducted leaves a gap, that goes some way towards explaining 
this lack of credibility, and in turn progress and development of CPTED. This 
deficiency can be summarised as two key issues: 1) The majority of research 
exploring the role of housing design in crime risk has solely utilised police recorded 
crime data; 2) The majority of research exploring the role of housing design in crime 
risk has taken a deductive approach, and in doing so has simply tested existing 
hypotheses. Using Armitage (2006) as an illustration (Armitage is selected due to 
familiarity with the detailed methods, and because it is often easier to critique your 
own approach), research commenced with a review of the literature relating to the 
impact of housing design on burglary. Using the findings of the review, a checklist 
containing 33 design features – the Burgess Checklist, was developed. A sample of 
1058 properties were individually assessed by two researchers (independently) and 
each design feature was assessed against prior victimisation (using police recorded 
statistics) to create a vulnerability score for each design feature. Using the CPTED 
principle of ‘surveillance’ as an example:  
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Figure One: Research design of many CPTED studies  
 
 
Subsequent research modifies the methodology, uses a different data set or perhaps 
adds a self-reported crime element to the data, but surveillance is still being used as a 
starting point for exploration. These are without doubt valuable studies, but at what 
point did we stop to ask whether properties with pink front doors, say, experience 
higher or lower than expected levels of burglary, or to simply ask burglars to describe 
what features of design (if any) they were considering when making decisions 
regarding target selection? Even where studies have utilised offender narratives to 
ascertain perceptions of housing design, the focus has been deductive. Starting from 
the premise that a specific set of design principles influence crime risk, these studies 
have asked offenders to judge vulnerability based upon the presence or absence of 
design features (Cozens et al. 2001, 2002). The methodology has merits, but the 
Prior research suggests that surveillance plays a key role 
in influencing crime risk. 
Levels of surveillance are measured in a sample of 1058 
properties.
Prior victimisation is assessed for each of the 1058 
properties. 
Levels of surveillance are compared with prior crime 
victimisation. 
Findings reveal that properties with high levels of natural 
surveillance experience less crime - surveillance is 
confirmed as a CPTED principle. 
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option for open narrative regarding vulnerability of design features is limited (if 
present at all).    
 
Other limitations exist, including the need to update the principles to account for 
changing patterns of offending – drug use and its impact upon offender decision 
making, as well as improvements in security products and their impact upon modus 
operandi. As with any crime reduction measure, CPTED’s success is determined to a 
large extent by the key organisations that implement it. A recent study of a small 
sample of Crime Prevention Design Advisors (CPDAs) in England and Wales 
(Armitage and Monchuk, 2017) found that, when assessing a set of plans for a 
proposed development, 90% of the sample referred to the term surveillance, but only 
30% referred to defensible space, 10% to physical security and 10% to management 
and maintenance. None of the sample referenced the term movement control. This 
could be explained as an issue of semantics. However, when analysing the extent to 
which they referenced the ‘concept’ as opposed to the specific term, the findings 
remained concerning. The entire sample mentioned the concepts of surveillance, 
movement control and defensible space. Seventy per cent referenced the concept of 
physical security but only 30% referenced the concept of management and 
maintenance. With significant cuts in both police (CPDAs) and local authority 
(Planning Officers, Development Control) staff, reductions in training budgets and 
deregulation within the planning system, it is vital that there is a clearer description of 
CPTED – not just as a theory or concept, but also as a series of components that can 
be defined, implemented and measured. This paper aims to investigate the extent to 
which burglars’ views of the crime risk associated with the design and layout of 
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residential housing aligns with existing CPTED theory, guidance and standards. The 
key research questions explored are: 
- When describing the features of housing design that influence their decision 
making, do burglars refer to some features more regularly than others? 
- When describing the features of housing design that influence their decision 
making, do burglars reference the same principles/concepts that are presented 
in CPTED literature? 
- Is there consistency between burglars in their interpretation of the risk 
associated with the design and layout of residential housing and their 
subsequent decision to offend against that target?  
 
Data and methods 
The research presented within this paper was conducted between October 2014 and 
April 2016 in West Yorkshire, England. The sample included twenty-two incarcerated 
adult males convicted of burglary offences and identified by the Integrated Offender 
Management Team to be prolific. The extent to which a burglar was defined as 
‘prolific’ was not predefined. In their study of prolific offenders in West Yorkshire, 
Townsley and Pease (2002) identified prolific burglars as being responsible for 
approximately five burglaries per month. The extent of offending prior to sentence 
was not a specific question within this study. Where offenders self declared offending 
levels (ten of the 22 offenders), this ranged from one burglary a day (offender 19) to 
between five and ten a day (offender 16). The offenders took part in the research 
voluntarily and recruitment took place post sentencing to avoid involvement for 
bargaining purposes. The recruitment process was time consuming – taking 18 
months to recruit 22 participants.  
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Interviews took place within prison with one participant, one interviewer and one note 
taker  (a note taker was required as no recording equipment was used). Interviews 
were semi structured, with participants asked to look at a series of sixteen images of 
residential housing (see Figure Two) and to describe: “From what you can see from 
the photo, can you describe what would attract you to this property when selecting a 
target for burglary.” And “From what you can see from the photo, can you describe 
what would deter you (put you off) from selecting this property as a target for 
burglary.” Participants were informed that there was no right or wrong answer and 
were not prompted during their response.  
Figure Two: 16 Images  
    
    
    
    
 
The images were taken in a variety of different locations across England. They 
included a mix of old and new properties, social and privately owned housing. There 
were, unavoidably, prior assumptions from the researchers involved (who selected the 
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images) regarding the design principles that might influence target selection. 
However, as the desire to conduct this piece of research had emerged from the 
concerns regarding the current relevance of CPTED principles, and the extent to 
which these incorporated offender narratives, it is the author’s view that the images 
selected did not unduly lead the participants towards the discussion of existing 
CPTED principles. 
 
Interviews were transcribed and thematic analysis was used to identify patterns or 
themes in responses.  Content analysis was used to count the regularity with which 
those themes were discussed, and to assess the levels of consistency between offender 
accounts. The rationale for this study was clearly based upon the desire to explore 
largely undirected offender accounts, the desired outcome being a review of what is 
considered to be the key principles of CPTED within residential housing. As Ashton 
et al. (1998:275) highlight: “With rich qualitative data of this kind, the choice for 
analysis lies between, on the one hand, developing complex coding schemes and 
laborious classification of responses, and on the other a more user-friendly general 
summary of burglar accounts”. This study was inclined towards the latter.   
 
Risks and limitations  
This, in the view of the author, is a valuable study that complements, updates and 
focuses existing research. It enhances existing studies on design and crime risk by 
adding offender accounts. Whilst the accounts of active offenders can provide details 
not captured through other research methods, there are undoubtedly risks and 
limitations with this approach. The first and most perceptible risk is false narratives 
from participants. There is a possibility that offenders will approach the responses 
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with an element of bravado – for example, I’m not deterred by anything, thus 
underplaying the deterrent effect of certain design features. Conversely, offenders 
may downplay their boldness – for example, No, I wouldn’t burgle them, thus risking 
over-estimating the deterrent effect of certain design features. In collecting and 
analysing offender responses, there must be clear consideration of the offenders’ 
motives for participating. Copes and Hochstetler (2014:20) summarise these as 
immediate rewards (including financial incentives, conversations with outsiders, a 
change of setting and curiosity), psychological benefits (including catharsis and 
helping others) and misunderstanding – the extent to which the participant believes 
that taking part will influence their sentence or relationship with prison staff. “The 
motives that inmates have for participating in research ultimately affect the nature of 
the stories they relay and the type of information they withhold”. Whilst the 
participants involved in this study were not offered a financial reward, and 
participation was only offered post-sentencing, these elements may still have played a 
role in their decision to take part. The extent to which these reasons impact upon the 
findings is uncertain, but it is clear that conclusions should be considered alongside 
additional research, as opposed to being viewed in isolation or as definitive.   
 
The second risk relates to the focus upon prolific offenders. Previous research 
suggests that a large proportion of burglaries committed by prolific offenders are 
repeats (Everson, 2000). The risk here relates to the potential to overemphasise the 
importance of design features that influence repeat offending.  
 
The third risk relates to the impact of drug use on offender decision-making. Of the 
sample of 22 offenders, 17 described themselves as drug users – not just taking drugs, 
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but committing burglaries whilst under the influence of drugs. The combination was 
predominantly Heroin and Cocaine; however, some described taking mephedrone, 
alcohol, cannabis, crack, amphetamine and MDMA. The risk associated with using 
these participants is difficult to determine; however, it is highly likely that this will 
downplay the deterrence effect of specific design features: “I would keep going until I 
got in” (Offender 16) or “You feel like you’re invincible” (Offender 15).  
 
An additional risk relates to the sample being selected from those burglars who have 
been detected and sentenced. To what extent does this sample represent unsuccessful, 
overconfident offenders – those making poor decisions regarding suitable targets? 
The risk here could be that the sample overstate the deterrent effect of certain design 
features:  “Ahhhh private road, I got arrested on one of those” (Offender 5). Or that 
they minimise the deterrent effect of specific design features because they are by 
nature takers of excessive risks.  
 
Further limitations include (but are not limited to) the focus specifically upon 
burglary within a UK setting. The sample are prolific burglars and the images are of 
residential housing. Thus, the critique of CPTED principles must be limited to its 
approach to burglary prevention/reduction. The sample are selected from prisons in 
England and the images are of residential housing in England. Again, this could 
potentially limit the critique of CPTED to its application to residential housing and 
offenders within the UK.  
 
Findings  
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Twenty-two incarcerated adult male burglars were shown a series of 16 images of 
residential housing. The images were presented in a consistent order with no prompts 
from the interviewer. As interviews were largely unstructured, lasting between 45 and 
90 minutes, the responses explored many issues including (but not limited to) 
pathways into crime, drug use, co-offending, desistance and product selection/re-sale. 
The focus of this paper is burglar perspectives of housing design, thus the findings 
presented here are limited to those themes.  
 
Burglars’ take on CPTED 
Taking the five principles of surveillance, movement control, physical security, 
management and maintenance and defensible space (those principles of CPTED as 
defined by Armitage, 2013) the responses from the 22 participants were analysed to 
establish the extent to which these specific terms, or the concept of these terms were 
referenced. Predictably, the analysis revealed just one specific reference to a CPTED 
principle – this being management and maintenance. The specific terms: surveillance, 
movement control, physical security and defensible space were not referenced by the 
22 participants. Examining references to the five concepts (as opposed to the specific 
terms) revealed more interesting findings.  As can be seen in Table One, all 
participants referenced the concepts of surveillance and physical security. Eighty-two 
per cent (n=18) referenced the concept of movement control, 77% (n=16) the concept 
of management and maintenance and 36% (n=8) referred to the concept of defensible 
space.  
Table One: Proportion of burglars referencing the five concepts of CPTED 
CPTED principle Proportion of offenders who referred to 
each CPTED concept (n=22) 
Surveillance  100% 
Physical security 100% 
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Movement control 82% 
Management and maintenance  77% 
Defensible space  36% 
 
As can be seen in Table Two, in discussing the 16 images, the concept of surveillance 
was referred to 133 times, physical security 103 times, management and maintenance 
40 times, movement control 39 times and the concept of defensible space was just 
referred to on 11 occasions.  
Table Two: Number of references the specific principles and concepts of CPTED 
CPTED principle Number of specific 
references to the 
term 
Number of references to the 
concept  
Surveillance  0 133 
Physical security 0 103 
Management and 
maintenance  
1 40 
Movement control 0 39 
Defensible space  0 11 
 
The five principles of CPTED 
Looking in more detail at reference to the five concepts, it is clear that the sample of 
22 burglars confirmed the importance of many of the principles, yet raised some 
concerns regarding others.  
 
Surveillance 
Whilst none of the offenders used the specific term ‘surveillance’, all referred to the 
concept and all considered this to be a clear deterrent in target selection. The threats 
or benefits associated with surveillance included: 1) Being observed by residents, 
neighbours or passers by – thus offenders preferred limited surveillance from others; 
2) Being able to watch for potential threats or risks – thus offenders preferred 
enhanced surveillance of others; 3) Being able to see into a property and assess the 
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potential risks and rewards – thus offenders preferred enhanced surveillance of a 
target. Terminology used to describe the concept of surveillance included being 
‘seen’, ‘watched’, ‘looked at’, ‘overlooked’ or ‘noticed’. Conversely, being able to: 
‘hide’, ‘be concealed’, ‘view blocked’. In relation to the third threat/benefit of 
requiring some element of surveillance to assess risks and rewards, offenders used the 
terms: ‘good view of the street’, ‘keep an eye out for each other’ and  ‘too much to 
watch for’. 
 
Features of housing design that deterred the sample of offenders confirmed many of 
the existing elements of CPTED standards and guidance. Offenders regularly referred 
to the risks of having large windows at the front of a property, allowing residents to 
see them entering the street and assessing the property: “The front windows are nice 
and big too, so it'd mean that I could be seen easier if I was inside” (Offender Ten). 
 
The same risks of being seen by residents were referenced in relation to the position 
of rooms within a property. Several offenders spoke of children’s bedrooms being 
located at the rear of properties and how this provides an additional incentive to target 
the rear – out of sight of neighbours and unlikely to be observed by a waking child: 
“The adults have a main bedroom at the front, so if they hear something and look out 
the window, it'll be at the front not where the burglar is. Kids bedrooms are usually at 
the back” (Offender Eight). 
 
Offenders were deterred by housing developments where surrounding properties 
faced onto the street, allowing neighbours to observe them entering and exiting a 
development and property: “I'd keep away. Would want nothing to do with that. They  
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could be gawping out the windows - you only need one of them on that street” 
(Offender 16). 
 
Another design feature that acted as a clear deterrence, based upon the principle of 
enhanced surveillance, was the road layout of a true cul-de-sac. A cul-de-sac has one 
vehicular entry/exit point only, however, some culs-de-sac are ‘leaky’, with 
pedestrian walkways allowing entry and exit on foot. A true cul-de-sac would have no 
connecting footpaths, with entry in a vehicle or on foot via one point only. Offenders 
expressed the view that this housing design risks observation from neighbouring 
properties as the offender has to enter the development, commit their offence, and 
leave the development via the same road.  
 
 “I wouldn't target houses on a cul-de-sac because you feel  
 trapped and it's difficult if someone challenges you. They might  
 say what are you doing and you say you are lost and then you  
 have to walk back out the way you came in as they are looking at  
 you” (Offender Five).  
 
Offenders were also deterred by low or open property boundaries – those that allowed 
neighbours and passers by to see them as they entered/exited a property: “Open 
fences would put me off” (Participant 12), and: “I'd feel more exposed if the walls and 
fences were lower” (Offender 15).  
 
Features of housing design, specific to the concept of surveillance, that did not deter 
the sample of 22 offenders included visible displays indicating the presence of 
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Neighbourhood Watch, and high/solid property boundaries. In relation to high 
fences/hedges, offenders expressed the view that these allow them to conduct a 
burglary without the risk of being observed by neighbours or passers by: “I like solid 
fences like these as no-one can see you. Once you are over these fences you are safe - 
in a comfort zone” (Offender 12). 
 
The idea of neighbours watching them was a clear deterrent, but all offenders stated 
that they did not equate Neighbourhood Watch with this risk – thus the presence of a 
sign does not convince them that they are being observed: “It’s like the signs are up 
there but there is no action” (Offender 5).   
 
Physical security 
The concept of physical security was referred to by all 22 of the offenders. Offenders 
were able to identify the quality of door locks from the photographs and focused upon 
the extent to which they believed the door lock could be snapped or mole gripped.  
 
 “That would be easy. The lock on that door looks like an old one.  
 The newer ones have thicker handles around them and are harder  
 to get through. I'd use mole grips and a screwdriver. Gold casing around  
 the handle will come off straight away and it'd take me around  
 a minute to get in” (Offender Eight).  
 
Reference to other security measures was less consistent. With the exception of one 
brand of police monitored burglar alarm, these were seen as ineffective as a burglary 
deterrent. Offenders regularly discussed methods for disabling alarms. These included 
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spraying expanding polyurethane foam into the external alarm box the night before 
the burglary – the alarm would be activated but the sound would not be heard: “I 
would buy foam sealant from DIY stores. Some took 24 hours to set, some quicker. I'd 
seal them up during the night and go back and do the houses the day after. The 
alarms still go off but you can't hear them” (Offender Nine). Another method of 
deactivating the alarm involved taking the internal alarm box off the wall once inside 
the property, with several participants stating that, for the majority of brands, this 
would deactivate the alarm: “Good alarms like ***  don't stop when you pull them off 
the wall. The cheap ones do” (Offender 13). The majority of participants expressed 
the view that in most instances the alarm is not activated. However, where it is, 
neighbours and passers by rarely respond.   
 
The responses regarding security gates were less consistent. Some participants viewed 
these as a deterrent: “It looks secure. The gates are a good idea. I'd like to live 
somewhere like that to be honest” (Offender 19). Whilst for others, they conveyed the 
impression that the properties had something worth taking. Or worse still, put the 
offender burglar at ease: “The fence wouldn't deter me. In actual fact it would put me 
at ease as I could hear the fence rattle if someone came in” (Offender Three).  
 
The presence of security grilles was viewed, by all participants who noted them, as an 
attractor. Participants saw them as a challenge, and suggested that the presence of 
excessive security must mean that the residents have something to protect – in this 
case the perception was that the residents were protecting a cannabis grow: “That 
security grille makes me think there's something worth taking” (Offender 21), and: “It 
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looks like a cannabis farm to me - it would definitely attract some interest from 
burglars” (Offender Eight).  
 
 
Movement control 
The concept of movement control – limiting access into, through and out of a housing 
development, was referred to by 18 of the 22 offenders. Explanations given by the 
offenders related to three potential benefits/threats, these were that through 
movement: 1) Enables the offender to ‘root’ for a suitable target; 2) Allows the 
offender to enter a development, commit an offence and exit the development without 
retracing their steps – thus enhancing risk of observation; 3) Allows the offender to 
evade the police – footpaths benefiting those with enhanced knowledge of the area 
and those on foot; 4) Provides the offender with a legitimate reason to be in an area.  
 
The terminology used by offenders to describe this principle included: ‘get away’, 
‘get in and out’, ‘way out’, ‘can go either way’, and ‘escape’. Conversely, limited 
through movement was described as being ‘trapped’ and ‘boxed in’. When describing 
the legitimacy that through movement allows, offenders used the terms: ‘allowed to 
be there’, ‘can walk up and down’, ‘no-one can question you’. The terms ‘like a 
maze’, ‘hiding places’ and ‘police can’t get there’ were used to reference the 
advantage that footpaths provide for those on foot and for those with knowledge of 
the area.  
 
In terms of the design and layout of residential housing, limiting the presence of 
footpaths within a development acted to deter offenders. It was clear that participants 
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looked for footpaths as a means of accessing and exiting a development without the 
need to retrace their steps, to root for a suitable target and to provide a legitimacy 
should they be challenged. Offender Six describes that legitimacy: “The houses are 
on a public footpath, no one would give me a second glance if I walked up and down. 
Even if a tramp walked up and down they wouldn't look out of place. It's a footpath, 
no-one can question you” (Offender Six).  
 
Offenders described how footpaths prevent the need to exit a development the way 
that they entered, reducing the likelihood of observation and subsequent 
identification: “If it’s a cul-de-sac then it’s usually one way in and one way out. You 
would be stupid to do a cul-de-sac” (Offender 8).  
 
Footpaths were also described as a means of escape, a way to plan ahead exactly how 
you will enter, move through and exit a development: “The appeal of a footpath is 
that you know how you are getting in and how you escape” (Offender 3).  
 
Offenders also described how footpaths provide an advantage for those with 
knowledge of the area and those on foot, leaving the police with a distinct 
disadvantage in relation to the offender: “Burglars like footpaths, it makes it easy as 
the police can’t get there easily” (Offender 17).  
 
Offenders spoke of the risks associated with true culs-de-sac and the possibilities of 
being trapped should the police attend the scene: “If I was in there and the police 
came I would be boxed in and wouldn't have an excuse for being in there. I couldn't 
say 'I'm just walking home Officer” (Offender Ten). 
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Management and maintenance 
The concept of management and maintenance was referred to by 16 of the 22 
offenders. Terminology used included: ‘overflowing bins’, ‘grass isn’t cut’, ‘old’, 
‘knackered’, ‘not tended’, ‘neat and tidy’, ‘smells of old people’, ‘being renovated’, 
‘mess’, ‘scruffy’, ‘untidy’ and ‘rubbish’. Unlike the previous three principles, the 
direction of influence upon crime risk was not straightforward. Three key 
interpretations emerged from the 22 interviews, these were: 1) A property with low 
levels of management and maintenance is attractive because an abundance of rubbish 
means the residents will have lots of things to steal. “They’ve got four bins. Why do 
they need so many? It tells me they spend a lot of money on food, so they’ve got 
money. Rubbish comes from one thing – buying stuff!” (Offender 9). 2) A property 
with low levels of management and maintenance is attractive because a lack of care 
equates to less care regarding security: “They’re sloppy, which means they might have 
left their keys in the door, or might have left the door open” (Offender 16). 
Conversely, a well maintained property is likely to have residents that care about 
security and are vigilant regarding strangers: “It’s manicured so someone takes time 
to look after it and they’re probably looking out for people like me coming along 
(Offender 16). 3) A property with low levels of management and maintenance is 
unattractive because if the residents cannot take care of their garden they will have 
very little worth stealing: “The grass isn’t cut, the fence is old, it doesn’t look 
worthwhile” (Offender 13). If they look after the garden, they will look after the 
house – thus a tidy garden equates to goods worth stealing: “If they take care of their 
garden they’ve got something worth stealing” (Offender 17). “I would actively look 
for places like this. If they have a neat garden you know they have something to steal. 
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You know they look after themselves and the house” (Offender Three). Responses 
were evenly split between the perception that maintenance equates to an attractive 
versus an unattractive target.  
 
Defensible space  
Whilst the concept of defensible space was demonstrated in several of the images, 
only eight of the 22 offenders made reference to it. Terminology used by the 
offenders to describe this principle included: ‘everyone knows each other’, ‘you’re an 
outsider’, ‘they’d recognise you’, ‘I would feel awkward’, ‘own little community’, 
‘keep an eye out for each other’. While there was little doubt that the perception of a 
small development, where residents were likely to know each other deterred the 
offenders, some of the design features associated with creating defensible space 
appeared to attract the offenders. Image 13 (see Figure 2) showed a small cul-de-sac 
with all properties facing the street, a narrowing of the road and a change in road 
colour and texture at the entrance to the estate. The word ‘private’ was also painted in 
large white letters on the road at the entrance to the estate.  
 
Several participants were deterred by, what they described as: “like walking into their 
own little community” (Offender 14). This largely related to the perception that the 
residents would know each other and that a stranger would not only look out of place, 
but would likely to be challenged by residents – confirming the concept of defensible 
space as a deterrent: “Everyone that lives there will be focused on the entrance and 
what goes on. They'll all know each other and keep an eye out for each other - give 
the key to the coal man that sort of thing” (Offender 18). 
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However, the more frequent response was that the narrowed road entrance, the 
‘private’ signage and the change in road colour and texture, suggested exclusivity and 
wealth, making this development an attractive target: “The private road sign and the 
change in road colour and texture give me the impression that it is an exclusive area - 
they have more money and that would attract not deter me” (Offender Three).  
 
The vast majority of responses equated the word ‘private’ with wealth – suggesting 
that ‘private’ means privately owned and, therefore, not social housing: “Private Road 
suggests that it's not council housing so they won't be on benefits” (Offender Three), 
and:  “Private Road means they've got money, they're middle to high class people - 
working people and I'd be attracted straight away. I'd think private road they've got 
coin” (Offender Nine).  
 
Table Three summarises these findings, outlining the key effective, ambiguous and 
counterproductive CPTED related strategies and these are discussed later in the paper 
in relation to the requirement for further research. It should be noted that these are 
simply those strategies highlighted within the interviews and are not an exhaustive 
evaluation of CPTED measures.  
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Table Three: CPTED principles and issues of operationalisation  
CPTED 
principle 
Rank 
(number of 
references) 
Effective 
Strategies 
Ambiguous 
Strategies  
Counter- 
productive 
Strategies  
Surveillance  1st (133) Large windows 
at the front of 
properties. 
 
Adult bedrooms 
at the rear of the 
property. 
 
Surrounding 
properties facing 
the street. 
 
True cul-de-sac. 
 
Low/open 
property 
boundaries.  
The presence of 
Neighbourhood 
Watch  
Children’s 
bedroom at the 
rear of the 
property. 
 
High/solid 
property 
boundaries.  
Physical 
security 
2nd (103) ADT burglar 
alarm. 
 
Anti-snap lock. 
Burglar alarms 
(other than 
ADT).  
 
Security gates. 
Security 
grilles/bars.  
Management 
and 
maintenance  
3rd (40)   Removing 
litter/rubbish. 
 
Looked 
after/tidy 
garden. 
 
Movement 
control 
4th (39) True cul-de-sac. 
 
Removing 
presence of 
footpaths and/or 
alleyways.  
 Footpaths/alleyw
ays.  
 
Leaky cul-de-
sac. 
Defensible 
space  
5th (11) Houses facing 
onto the street. 
 
True cul-de-sac. 
 Use of ‘private’ 
signs or ‘private’ 
painted on street.   
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Limited number 
of properties.  
 
 
Can CPTED be universally applied?  
Whilst the findings from interviews with 22 offenders confirmed the importance of 
design in influencing target selection, there are doubts about the direction and strength 
of influence. Before summarising, it is worth discussing the extent to which offenders 
concurred, and as a consequence, the extent to which a CPTED standard can be 
universally applied. Table Four displays the responses from each of the 22 
participants to the 16 images. Analysis shows that, for nine of the 16 images, there 
was a statistically significant difference between the proportion of ‘yes’ and ‘no’ 
responses. To clarify, for seven of these images, offenders were more likely to agree 
with one another that they would offend against the property. For two of the images, 
offenders were more likely to agree with one another that they would not offend 
against the property. For the remaining images, there was no statistically significant 
agreement that ‘yes’ they would offend against that property or ‘no’ they would not. 
The image with the lowest number of ‘yes’ responses was image 16 with one yes 
response (5% of the sample). The image with the highest ‘yes’ responses was image 
four with 20 (91%). The mean number of yes responses was 14 (62%), median 15 
(68%). 
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Table Four: Extent of agreement between the offender sample 
Image number Number of yes 
responses 
Proportion of yes 
responses 
P Value Statistically 
significant1 
1 6 27% 0.050 ✓ 
2 18 82% 0.004 ✓ 
3 17 78% 0.017 ✓ 
4 20 91% 0.004 ✓ 
5 18 82% 0.017 ✓ 
6 19 86% 0.001 ✓ 
7 15 68% 0.134 - 
8 10 45% 0.832 - 
9 17 77% 0.017 ✓ 
10 2 9% 0.000 ✓ 
11 15 68% 0.134 - 
12 12 55% 0.832 - 
13 14 64% 0.236 - 
14 15 68% 0.134 - 
15 19 86% 0.001 ✓ 
16 1 5% 0.000 ✓ 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
1 P<0.05 One sample binomial test – two tailed.  
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Discussion and further research 
This paper has explored the importance of the impact of housing design on burglary 
risk from the perspective of 22 burglars within UK prisons. The findings confirmed 
the importance of design on offender decision-making, but emphasised the need to re-
assess the existing CPTED principles and their means of implementation. 
Consideration should be given to the combination and weighting of each principle; 
the findings suggest that surveillance clearly plays a major role in influencing 
decision-making, defensible space not so. Does the implementation of five principles 
afford five times the protection of one? Increasing the sample size to establish the 
extent to which this finding continues to be supported would strengthen any case for 
re-assessing CPTED’s concepts. 
 
Specific interpretation of CPTED principles should also be reconsidered, with a focus 
upon those ambiguous strategies highlighted in Table Three. High rear fences are 
advised at the rear of properties in vulnerable locations (Secured by Design New 
Homes, 2016), yet offenders clearly state the appeal of such measures. ‘Private’ signs 
are used as a territorial marker, yet offenders are attracted by what they see as 
connotations of wealth and exclusivity, and existing justifications for the 
consideration of management and maintenance showed very little alignment with 
offender perceptions. Further research needs to focus upon those strategies that are 
actively encouraged within CPTED (or mandatory within award schemes such as 
SBD) – such as the use high rear fences where properties are bounded by footpaths. 
The concept of management and maintenance must be further explored, and whilst its 
protection remains ambiguous, it is the author’s view that it should not be considered 
a principle of concept of CPTED. Other ambiguous strategies, including the use of 
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burglar alarms and private signs, should be further explored, but with less urgency 
given their status as beneficial as opposed to required.   
 
The bold and somewhat controversial findings within this paper could be further 
strengthened by several improvements to the methodology. These include increasing 
the sample size, interviewing offenders who have not been apprehended, increasing 
the number of participants who were not drug users at the time of the offence and 
including a number of less prolific offenders. Replicating the methodology within 
other countries would ascertain the extent to which these critiques are relevant 
elsewhere – does CPTED require refinement in the UK or within other contexts and 
cultures? Finally, the focus upon residential burglary has limited the recommended 
refinements to one crime type. Further research should explore offender perspectives 
of design in relation to additional crime types including (but not limited to) retail 
crime, violent crime and vehicle crime outside of the residential setting.  
 
Conclusion 
CPTED is a well-established crime reduction measure. Evidence exists to suggest that 
individual features of housing design impact upon crime risk (Armitage, 2006; 
Armitage et al, 2011; Johnson and Bowers; 2010; Winchester and Jackson, 1982) and 
that combinations of these design features can be grouped together to produce 
effective interventions such as the UK’s Secured by Design and Police Label Secure 
Housing in the Netherlands (Armitage, 2000; Armitage and Monchuk, 2011; Vollaard 
and Ours, 2011). Progress has been made in encouraging, or even requiring, 
consideration for crime prevention within planning policy, guidance and legislation 
and physical security standards are now embedded in Building Regulations in 
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Scotland, England and Wales and the Netherlands. However, progress has not been 
entirely favourable and austerity and deregulation (particularly in England and Wales) 
has seen dramatic reductions in police numbers, police training budgets and the ability 
to influence building design through planning policy and guidance. With numbers of 
police Designing out Crime Officers (DOCOs) in England and Wales falling from 
347 in 2009 to just 125 in November 2014 (with further cuts following), and Local 
Authority Planning Officers seeing similar cuts, it is essential that CPTED and its 
requirements are not only clearly defined, but that we are certain that each element or 
component is fundamental in impacting upon crime risk.  This paper highlights the 
need not only to redefine the principles of CPTED, but to reconsider the refine these 
definitions. There is little doubt that a lack of clarity has impacted upon CPTED’s 
academic credibility within the field of Environmental Criminology and Crime 
Science, and this is both disappointing and unjust. Perhaps in studying CPTED we 
need to be cruel to be kind, and take CPTED to pieces before we can rebuild it.   
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